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Summary
We easily recover the causal properties of visual events,
enabling us to understand and predict changes in the phys-
ical world.We see a tennis racket hitting a ball and sense that
it caused the ball to fly over the net; we may also have an
eerie but equally compelling experience of causality if the
streetlights turn on just as we slam our car’s door. Both
perceptual [1] and cognitive [2] processes have been
proposed to explain these spontaneous inferences, but
without decisive evidence oneway or the other, the question
remains wide open [3–8]. Here, we address this long-
standing debate using visual adaptation—a powerful tool
to uncover neural populations that specialize in the analysis
of specific visual features [9–12]. After prolonged viewing of
causal collision events called ‘‘launches’’ [1], subsequently
viewed events were judged more often as noncausal. These
negative aftereffects of exposure to collisions are spatially
localized in retinotopic coordinates, the reference frame
shared by the retina and visual cortex. They are not ex-
plained by adaptation to other stimulus features and reveal
visual routines in retinotopic cortex that detect and adapt
to cause and effect in simple collision stimuli.
Results
We often have a strong sense of causality as events unfold,
where one event apparently triggers the next. The perception
of causality involves two components, one that is stimulus
based and one that is inference based. First, to see causal
structure between two events, they need to follow each other
with little delay, and in many cases, including collisions, they
also require contact. This spatiotemporal coincidence is the
stimulus-based component of perceptual causality. The
second component is an inference, merging two events into
one. Rather than seeing one object stopping and a second
one starting on its own, there is a continuity of action that is*Correspondence: martin.rolfs@hu-berlin.detransferred from the first object to the second. Using a visual
adaptation paradigm, we tested whether this inference occurs
on a perceptual level, which would allow experimental access
to the visual detection of causality and the parsing of events at
a perceptual stage.
To measure observers’ perception of causality, we dis-
played short animations of two test events, appearing either
above/below or to the left/right of a central fixation spot (Fig-
ure 1A). Each test event consisted of two gray discs that at
times were stationary and at other times moved across the
black background. Identical but mirror-symmetrical events
appeared simultaneously on both sides of the screen to
discourage reflexive eye movements. In each event, one disc
was initially stationary as the other one approached on a direct
path from a random direction. After 80 ms, when the two discs
overlapped by some amount, the moving disc froze and the
stationary one took off in the same direction at the same speed
(Figure 1B; see also Movie S1 available online). Depending on
the overlap between the two discswhen the second disc starts
moving (Figure 1C), these test events appear either causal or
noncausal. In particular, when there is little overlap, one disc
appears to causally launch the other’s motion, whereas
when there is large overlap, one disc appears to noncausally
pass over (or under) the other, which in turn remains stationary
[1, 13]. On every trial, observers pressed one of two buttons to
indicate what they perceived, a launch or a pass. By fitting
a psychometric function to each observer’s data, we obtained
the point of subjective equality (PSE), which captures the
amount of disc overlap at which the observer is equally likely
to report the event as a launch or a pass.
Adaptation to Collision Events, Appearing Causal
In our first experiment, each observer performed two blocks of
trials, and we measured two PSEs each time, one for events
presented left/right of fixation and one for events above/below
fixation. After the first block, in which we obtained baseline
PSEs for both sets of locations, observers saw an ‘‘adapting
stream’’ of 320 ‘‘collision’’ (or, launch [1]) stimuli (Figure 2A;
Movie S2)—two discs bouncing back and forth, clearly
appearing causal—while maintaining fixation at the screen
center. For half of the observers we showed these adapting
streams only at the horizontal locations, and for the other
half only at the vertical locations. Adapting streamswere orga-
nized in pairs, with the first stimulus in each pair having
a random direction of motion and the second having the oppo-
site direction. After this adaptation phase, we obtained
a second set of PSEs, one at the adapted locations and one
at the locations where no adapting streams had appeared.
Adaptation (provided it occurred) was topped up by a further
stream of 16 adapting stimuli preceding every test trial. The
critical dependent variable was the change in PSE at either
location. If prolonged exposure to phenomenologically causal
stimuli shifts the PSE, we have evidence for adaptation.
Before adaptation, observers’ PSEs were 0.63 6 0.07
(mean 6 SEM, where 1.0 indicates complete overlap) and
0.59 6 0.08 for the (to be) adapted and unadapted location,
respectively. Following adaptation, we observed a strong shift
of the psychometric function to the left for test events
(here, 0.25 disc diameters overlap)
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Figure 1. Procedure and Stimulus Design
(A) On every trial, two mirror-symmetrical test
events appeared either to the left/right of (shown
here) or above/below a central fixation spot.
(B) Test event. After 80 ms of motion, disc 1
(black) stops with some degree of overlap (here,
0.25 diameters) with disc 2 (blue). Disc 2 then
moves off in the same direction and at the same
speed.
(C) Test events had one of nine magnitudes of
overlap in their central frame.
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251presented at the adapted location (PSE = 0.34 6 0.06; Fig-
ure 2B, blue versus black curve). Events that were perceptually
ambiguous before adaptation (e.g., overlap of 0.625) were now
judged to be noncausal passes in the vast majority of trials;
events that were regularly perceived as causal before adapta-
tion (e.g., overlap of 0.375) had now become ambiguous.
Perception of test events at the unadapted location was less
affected (PSE = 0.51 6 0.06; Figure 2B, gray versus black
curve). We captured these effects by plotting the individual
changes in PSE at the adapted location against those at the
unadapted location (Figure 2C). Every observer’s data point
fell below the x axis, showing that the PSE decreased at the
adapted location (DPSEadapted =20.276 0.05, p < 10
29, Bayes
factor [BF] > 103), resulting in a substantial adaptation
effect (blue marker). We also observed a small adaptation
effect at the unadapted location (DPSEunadapted = 20.08 6
0.03, p < 0.01, BF = 0.42). Importantly, all data points fell
into the blue-shaded area, showing that the decrease in
PSE was larger at the adapted than at the unadapted0 0.25 0.5 0.75 1
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Afterlocation (DPSEadapted – DPSEunadapted =
20.19 6 0.03, p < 10210, BF > 104).
These results therefore uncover pro-
nounced and spatially specific negativeaftereffects of prolonged exposure to perceptually causal
collision stimuli.
Adaptation to Slip Events, Appearing Noncausal
In a second step, we examined whether adaptation to other
visual features of the adapting stimuli might explain the
change in observers’ judgments of causality. To do so, we
repeated the first experiment using a ‘‘slip’’ adaptation stim-
ulus (Figure 3A; Movie S3), designed to match the collision
adaptation stimulus (Figure 2A) in as many physical properties
as possible—the number and appearance of the discs, spatio-
temporal contiguity, timing and number of motion onsets,
motion direction and speed, as well as the area covered by
the event—without leading to perceived causality. In a slip
adaptation stimulus, rather than stopping when it touches
the stationary one, the moving disc moves completely across
and comes to stop immediately on the other side. With no
delay, the initially stationary disc then starts off in the same
direction, leaving the impression of two independent motions.Figure 2. Adaptation to Causal Collisions
(A) Collision adaptation stimulus. After 80 ms of
motion, disc 1 (black) stops next to disc 2
(blue), which then moves off.
(B) Average proportion of pass reports with
cumulative Gaussian psychometric functions
modeling the relationship between disc overlap
and perceptual reports. Error bars are SEM.
(C) Individual (black dots) and average (blue
marker) changes in point of subjective equality
(PSE) for the adapted and unadapted test loca-
tions. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals
(thick bar: comparison against line of equality);
p values are bootstrapped tests against zero. In
the blue-shaded area, the decrease in DPSEs
is larger at the adapted than at the unadapted
location.
See also Figure S1.
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Figure 3. Adaptation to Noncausal Slips
(A) Slip adaptation stimulus. Disc 1 (black) moves
toward disc 2 (blue), slips over it, and comes to
stop on the other side after 130 ms of motion.
Disc 2 then moves off.
(B) Average proportion of pass reports with
psychometric functions. Conventions are as in
Figure 2B.
(C) Individual changes in PSE. Conventions are as
in Figure 2C.
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252Note that slip and collision adaptation stimuli both feature
spatial as well as temporal coincidence; specifically, one
object stops next to the other just as the other takes off.
However, one appears causal and the other does not.
Contrary to the effects of adaptation to collisions, adaptation
to slip stimuli had little or no effect on observers’ perceptual
reports. Before adaptation, we again observed the increase
in the proportion of pass reports with increasing disc overlap
of the test stimuli (Figure 3B, black), with PSEs of 0.45 6 0.03
and 0.416 0.05 for the (to be) adapted and unadapted location,
respectively. On average, psychometric functions shifted
slightly to the right both for the adapted (Figure 3B, blue;
PSE: 0.53 6 0.05; DPSEadapted = 0.08 6 0.04, p = 0.052, BF =
0.19) and the unadapted location (Figure 3B, gray; PSE: 0.476
0.06;DPSEunadapted = 0.076 0.04, p = 0.076, BF = 0.15), with no
differencebetween them (DPSEadapted –DPSEunadapted = 0.016
0.02, p = 0.52, BF < 1021). Individual changes in PSEs are
shown in Figure 3C. A direct statistical comparison of these
results to those from experiment 1 again established the
spatial specificity of aftereffects following adaptation to colli-
sion versus adaptation to slip events (20.20 6 0.03, p < 1028,
BF > 103). We conclude that the perceptual changes after
exposure to streams of collisions were not caused by adapta-
tion to any of the visual attributes shared by collision and slip
stimuli. Instead, adaptation affected visual processing of
causal structure, present only in our collision stimuli.
An alternative explanation of the effect of adaptation is that it
did not affect perceived causality directly but instead changed
the perceived timing of the individual events, which in turn
reduced perceived causality [1, 14–17]. Our collision and slip
stimuli were constructed to equate the timing of the two discs’
motions, but to be sure, we ran a second control experiment to
test potential effects of timing directly (see Supplemental
Results and Figure S1). These supplemental results showed
that we had adapted detectors of causality for this type of
stimuli, not detectors of timing.Reference Frame of Adaptation to
Collision Events
In a final experiment, we determined the
reference frame of adaptation to causal
collision stimuli. If this adaptation of
perceptual causality occurs at early
stages of visual processing, we would
expect adaptation to occur in a retino-
topic frame of reference. In that case,
the strongest aftereffects would be
observed at locations falling on the
same patch of the retina (and retinotopi-
cally organized brain areas). The afteref-
fects observed in the first experiment,
however, are equally compatible with
changes of perception tagged to alocation in the world, possibly indicating an association of
the experience with the adaptation stimulus with a location
in external space. In that case, the strongest aftereffectswould
be observed at a fixed location in space, irrespective of the
retinal location of the test. Identifying the reference frame of
adaptation therefore requires changes in gaze position
between adaptation and test [18].
We presented stimuli on one side of fixation and monitored
eye position, ensuring that stimuli occurred at the intended
retinal location (Figure S2). Observers made two fixation steps
before a test event appeared—first away from initial fixation,
then either back to fixation or to the opposite location (Fig-
ure 4A). Two initial blocks of test trials preceded the adaptation
phase (another two blocks) where an adaptation stream of 320
collision stimuli appeared before the first and another 16
appeared before every subsequent test trial. Depending on
(1) the correspondence of the fixation location during
adaptation and test stimulus presentation and (2) the location
of the test event relative to fixation, the test fell onto the same
retinal but different spatial location (retinotopic aftereffect;
green in Figure 4A), the same spatial but different retinal loca-
tion (spatiotopic; beige), the same spatial and retinal location
(full; blue), or an eccentricity-matched unadapted location
(nonspecific; gray).
Data from four participants showed an aftereffect only if test
events coincided with the adaptation stream in retinal coordi-
nates, i.e., in the retinotopic and full aftereffect conditions
(Figure 4B; PSEs at nonspecific location: 0.64 6 0.02 before
versus 0.64 6 0.02 after adaptation, BF < 1021; full: 0.63 6
0.03 versus 0.48 6 0.03, BF > 1012; spatiotopic: 0.67 6 0.05
versus 0.65 6 0.04, BF < 1021; retinotopic: 0.64 6 0.04 versus
0.466 0.03, BF > 102). Accordingly, an ANOVA with test phase
(before versus after adaptation), retinal test location (adapted
versus unadapted), and fixation position (matched versus
unmatched between adaptation and test) as within-subject
factors yielded significant effects of retinal test location
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Figure 4. Reference Frame of Adaptation to
Collisions
(A) Observers fixated a spot 5 to the left or to the
right of the screen center. Following the adapta-
tion stream at the screen center, observers
made two fixation steps (red arrows). Subse-
quently, a test event occurred at 5 eccentricity,
either to the left or to the right of fixation, yielding
a total of four possible test locations: nonspecific
(gray), full aftereffect (blue), spatiotopic (beige),
and retinotopic (green).
(B) Average proportion of pass reports with
psychometric functions. Conventions are as in
Figure 2B.
See also Figure S2.
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253[F(1,3) = 219.21, p < 0.001] and test phase [F(1,3) = 64.33,
p = 0.004] as well as an interaction of these two factors
[F(1,3) = 67.53, p = 0.004; other Fs < 1.8, p values > 0.27].
Discussion
The retinal specificity of the observed aftereffects argues
strongly that it is a consequence of a shift in a perceptual, not
a cognitive, boundary between causal and noncausal events.
Previous experiments have shown that repeated exposure to
or training in the categorization of causal stimuli alters the
frequency of causal reports, but these shifts have been inter-
preted as cognitive anchoring effects [19, 20]. Cognitive
boundary shifts are common and may even be contingent on
location in the world—what looks like steam over a pot will
look like smoke over a chimney. Never, however, will cognitive
boundary shifts be specific to a particular location on our
retina, independent of location in the world. Nevertheless,
this retinal specificity, on its own, is not sufficient evidence
that causal processingoccurs at theperceptual level. The infer-
enceof causality is the end result of a chain of analyses, and the
adaptation of visual signals at early levels, prior to the determi-
nation of causality, could certainly produce a location-specific
effect. This would be true even if the final decision stage was
cognitive and nonretinotopic. Our conclusions therefore rest
on our combined results of retinotopically specific adaptation
and theabsenceof adaptation to slip events thatwerematched
to the collision events in low-level visual signals.
Visual adaptation demonstrates the perceptual conse-
quences of a reduction in the responsiveness of neural popu-
lations that encode primary visual features [10, 12]. Using thisgeneral paradigm, we provided support
for the existence of adaptable, visual
neurons (or neural populations) that
underlie the perception of at least one
causal interaction in dynamic scenes.
Stimuli that do not appear causal
(including our ‘‘slip’’ adaptation stimuli)
leave the responses of these neurons
unaffected. These neuronal populations
must be located in brain areas that
encode visual information in an eye-
centered reference frame, because the
resulting aftereffects are specific to the
adapted location on the retina. Candi-
dates for such areas are the mediotem-
poral area V5 and the superior temporal
sulcus, both of which have eye-centeredrepresentations [21] and are part of a network involved in the
perception of causal launches [22–25]. These areas also
respond to other forms of meaningful motion patterns, such
as biological motion [26, 27]. Using adaptation, we can now
examine the visual computations underlying the perception
of causal structure in the visual world. These include not only
the routines recognizing familiar motion patterns [28] but
also complex interactions involving cause and effect, possibly
even animacy and intentionality.
We have focused on one specific causal stimulus (collisions,
or launches) and have shown that it induces adaptation. It is
not yet known whether these aftereffects generalize to other
types of causal stimuli, but our finding takes a more important
step—it isolates a visual process that merges two events into
a single percept, thus parsing the continuity of action in the
visual scene. This finding allows us to move phenomena that
have been regarded as higher-level processes into the realm
of perception, opening them to systematic study using the
tools of perceptual science. In a similar sense, the discovery
of amodal completion allowed us to study the integration of
object structure behind an occluding surface, and the
discovery of apparent motion allowed us to study the merging
of two object identities at different locations and times into the
motion of a single one. Both of these percepts require sophis-
ticated inference, and it is now widely agreed that perception
is the locus of these advanced decisional processes. This
has led to pathbreaking studies of their neural correlates
[29–34]. The present findings take an equally important step
toward determining how the brain parses events and assigns
causal links, which paves the way for tracking down the neural
mechanisms underlying these visual processes.
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